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ABSTRACT
With regards to the evolutionary game model of collective financ-
ing between commercial banks and small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs), the self-guarantee mechanism formed within
the enterprise group is taken as the research background in the
paper. Under the circumstances of mortgage assets and unsecured
assets, the changing trend of the strategies of both sides in the
process of collective financing is made a discussion respectively.
Followed by the evolutionary game, it is concluded that under the
stable management strategy, commercial banks will offer different
loan strategies (collective or separate) after comprehensively judg-
ing the repayment probability of enterprises. For SMEs, loans at a
reasonable rate can prompt them to pay them back on time, how-
ever, high loan costs can lead to the possibility of total financing
default and the adverse circumstances of risk diffusion. More
importantly, collective financing of unsecured assets does not
increase the bank’s credit risk, while not only can it help banks
reduce the cost of loan review, but also alleviate the problem of
information opacity in SMEs, prevent the occurrence of default risk
and reduce the threshold for enterprises to obtain funds and also
provide a new way to solve the financing problems of SMEs.
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The healthy development of small and micro-sized enterprises plays a decisive role in
stabilising economic growth, adjusting industrial structure, and promoting techno-
logical innovation. However, these enterprises encounter difficulty in obtaining finan-
cial support from commercial banks or other financial institutions due to information
transparency problem, lack of accredited mortgages, and vulnerability to external eco-
nomic environment. Thus, some of these enterprises even resort to private usury.
Once these enterprises encounter difficulties in business operation, capital chain rup-
ture will occur, thereby leading them to a capital crisis for failure to repay the loan.
Serious social problems may even occur when the capital supplier recovers the loan.
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In 1931, MacMillan (1931), a British scholar, elaborated on the funding gap faced
by small and micro-sized enterprises in the process of creation and development,
which they referred to as the ‘Macmillan gap’. This finding shows the long-standing
problems in the financing difficulty of small and micro-sized enterprises. Advanced
economies and emerging market countries are applying different solutions to solve
this problem and break the bottleneck that hinders the rapid development of small
and micro-sized enterprises. Developed economies in Europe and America commonly
adopted financing methods, such as venture capital and GEM listing, to provide
financial assistance for small and micro-sized enterprises. These approaches achieved
good results. However, this type of direct financing can only serve as reference
because China’s capital market is not yet fully developed and some indirect financing
models that involve guarantee agencies are gradually developing. The practice of these
models shows the limited coverage of guarantee agencies in China. Moreover, the
guarantee costs are high and guarantee procedures are complicated. Only a few small
and micro-sized enterprises received funding through this model in the actual financ-
ing process. However, this type of ‘guarantee and credit enhancement’ financing
model is worth exploring. Moreover, many enterprises applied collective financing
models, such as the issuance of collective bonds, collective bills, or cluster financing,
due to the weak financing capability and high financing cost of individual small and
micro-sized enterprises. These models are typical collective financing models. In this
type of financing model, the enterprise pool either chooses to use a third-party guar-
antee agency for guarantee or raise funds in the financial market by virtue of the
company’s own ‘core competitiveness’ as guarantee condition (Gao, 2007). The for-
mer approach, which can allow multiple companies to jointly search for third-party
guarantee agencies, can improve the credit rating of companies in the collective and
reduce the financing costs of each enterprise. The latter approach is a self-guarantee
model built by enterprises in the group. This approach offers similar advantages,
increases the convenience of enterprise asset allocation within the group, and serves
as a mutual supervisory role for the enterprises within the group. These advantages
facilitate information transparency and enables enterprises to raise funds through
financial institutions such as banks.
This study analyzes strategy evolution and change trend in small and micro-sized
enterprises and financial institutions. Financial institutions without loss of generality
are simplified as commercial banks in this study. The analysis is based on the collect-
ive financing model and different loan-constrained conditions, namely, secured and
unsecured assets. This study aims to provide a theoretical basis for small and micro-
sized enterprises to obtain effective financing channels. The self-guarantee model
formed in small and micro-sized enterprises is used as research background with the
application of evolutionary game theory.
2. Literature review
2.1. Small and medium-sized enterprise loan
Making a comprehensive survey at the literature on the financial services provided by
commercial banks to small and medium-sized enterprises in recent years, most of
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them believe that large banks or foreign banks have little interest in providing finan-
cial services for small and medium-sized enterprises. However, when providing finan-
cial services to small and medium-sized enterprise, small banks or some professional
banks can use relational loans to overcome barriers to information opacity, so that
they have a comparative advantage. The main types of bank loans are divided into
relational loans and trading technical loans (Berger & Udell, 2006), where a relation-
ship loan based on trust has an advantage over long-term co-operation with banks in
promoting financial support for small and micro-businesses (Hernandez-Canovas &
Martınez-Solano, 2010). This kind of relationship loan, which is established by trust,
usually uses ‘soft information’ for credit review. For example, joint-stock banks can
obtain ‘soft information’ by asking corporate customers, enterprise suppliers, or busi-
ness partners to lend to small and medium-sized enterprise, thus providing lower
loan costs for small and medium-sized enterprise, therefore, such banks are more
important for small and medium-sized enterprise in post-transition economies
(Bartoli, Ferri, Murro, & Rotondi, 2013), however, large banks and foreign banks will
not adopt ‘hard information’ technologies such as small business rating technology or
fixed asset evaluation technology to carry out trading technical loans for small enter-
prises (Hasan, Jackowicz, Kowalewski, & Kozłowski, 2014). However, small medium-
sized enterprise trading technical loans are not without advantages, and small
medium-sized enterprise that obtain loans by means of fixed asset mortgages also
have an advantage in terms of loan interest rates (Huo, Feng, & Liu, 2015). More
generally, when different types of banks have new technologies, new business models,
or risk management models, they develop a broad range of financial products and
services for small medium-sized enterprise so that access to financing for small
medium-sized enterprise is no longer dependent on relational lending (De la Torre,
Perıa, & Schmukler, 2010). In China, commercial bank lending remains one of the
most important sources of financing for most small and medium-sized enterprise that
do not have experience in financing. However, there is no significant difference in
the risk of default arising from both the general credit loan and the third-party
secured mortgage (Song & Zhang, 2018). As a result, the traditional bank loan model
still needs to be explored and innovated to provide more diversified financial and
credit services for small medium-sized enterprise. For example, the asset mortgage
securitisation or collective financing model mentioned below is a change to the trad-
itional loan mode of small and medium-sized enterprise to meet the capital needs of
small and medium-sized enterprise at different stages of development.
2.2. SPV
In the face of the global economic crisis (2007–2009) and the European sovereign
debt crisis (2011–2013), there has also been a huge shift in the financing model of
small medium-sized enterprise in Europe, and innovative financing tools are helping
enterprises to get financial support as soon as possible to maintain business opera-
tions, Prelipcean and Boscoianu (2014) used SPV multiple times in a hybrid financing
framework based on government and special investment funds for small and micro
enterprise financing, which can overcome the shortcomings of financing difficulties
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in the capital markets of small and medium-sized enterprise and reduce the credit
risk of loans, bring stable expected cash flow for small and micro-business loans,
which is more common in the European market (Oricchio, Lugaresi, Crovetto, &
Fontana, 2017). Even though asset securitisation does counteract the negative impact
of information asymmetry (Albertazzi, Bottero, & Gambacorta, 2017). Franke and
Krahnen (2017) compared the SPV loan model of small and medium-sized enterprise
with the collective financing loan model and it’s believed that in order to avoid the
establishment of too many legal entities, the transaction cost of the collective financ-
ing loan model is lower than that of the mortgage asset securitisation model repre-
sented by SPV. The repeated communication among the members of the collection
reduces the audit cost of the loan collection by the rating agencies, and as a result, it
is preferred by the small and medium-sized enterprise.
2.3. Social capital
At present, scholars at home and abroad still have relatively little research on collect-
ive financing, and the idea of this financing model can be explained by the concept
of social capital. Granovetter (1973) put forward the concept of social capital and
defined it as the connection between individuals and groups, which is the social
resource brought about by the position of people in the social structure. Montgomery
(1996) introduced the concept of social capital into microcredit and explained the
restraint effect of social capital on the problem of borrower’s malicious arrears. As
the joint responsibility generated by the shared social capital in the group has a posi-
tive repayment effect on the borrower (Besley & Coate, 1995), the collection financing
group will increase the probability of repayment by screening, supervision and execu-
tion (Gine & Karlan, 2014). The existence of social capital usually lowers the cost of
enterprise financing (Uzzi, 1999) and brings higher benefits (Ghatak, 1999) to bor-
rower groups and when the individual social capital of collective financing is
increased, the probability of repayment of collective financing will also be increased
(de Quidt, Fetzer, & Ghatak, 2016). It can be said that the study of collective mem-
bers’ social capital provides a detailed theoretical basis for the construction of collect-
ive financing of small and medium-sized enterprise.
2.4. Collective financing
Under the credit environment of China, the discussion on collective financing is
gradually increasing in, Zhang and Liang (2004) believes that the community credit
resources can also be used as an important way to improve the credit level of small
and medium-sized enterprises to alleviate the problem of financing difficulties of
enterprises. With regards to different types of social credit resources, different social
credit cooperation organisations can be constructed to achieve the purpose of sustain-
able development of microcredit (Wang & Huang, 2006), and typical financing mod-
els using social capital, such as enterprise group, supply chain financing, industry
chain financing and collective financing, can all play a role in obtaining greater cred-
ibility for the members of the participating groups. Such kind of ‘group financing,
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pooled guarantee’ model overcomes the financing defect of small and medium-sized
enterprises that credit risk increases due to the defect of enterprise scale (Li, Li, Tang,
& Zhao, 2010; Zhang, Chen, & Cai, 2008). Outside China, there are a great number
of scholars who have conducted empirical studies on collective financing through
sample data from lending institutions, and it’s believed that this model is more popu-
lar with large banks. By means of peer supervision and joint responsibility, the col-
lective financing model of co-guarantee can be conductive for banks to reduce the
information asymmetry of enterprises (Columba, Gambacorta, & Mistrulli, 2010;
Bartoli, Ferri, & Murro, 2013). Similarly, from the point of view of loan institutions,
Chowdhury (2007) gives the criteria for judging the quality of credit members in col-
lective financing by means of theoretical model analysis. In addition, more and more
scholars pay attention to the influence of the size of pooled financing and the back-
ground of members on the efficiency of social capital in collective financing (Ahlin,
2015; Mukherjee & Bhattacharya, 2015), all of which provide a theoretical reference
for the construction of collective financing portfolio. Some other scholars also have
found that increasing the requirement of collateral in the process of collective financ-
ing will increase the probability of repayment, while it also reduces the degree of par-
ticipation in the credit market (Flatnes & Carter, 2016). Therefore, whether the
collateral has to exist in the bank collective financing of small medium-sized enter-
prise is still open to question.
The literature review shows that discussions on commercial bank loans and collect-
ive financing of small and micro-sized enterprises are conducted separately. Only a
few studies combined jointly analysed this innovative financing model. Several studies
also pointed out the insufficient mortgages often encountered in small and micro-
sized enterprise loans, but they did not provide an effective solution. The mortgage
financing channels of commercial banks failed to alleviate the shortage of funds for
small and micro-sized enterprises. Moreover, domestic and foreign studies on collect-
ive financing models mainly focused on their advantages. Specific discussions on the
interests of both parties in investment and financing were lacking. Thus, the present
study constructs collective financing modes under different constraints to examine
changes in the strategies of commercial banks and enterprises through evolutionary
game theory. This study also provides reasonable suggestions for improving the
financing environment of small and micro-sized enterprises.
3. The analysis of the collective financing loan model
Traditional game theory assumes that the player is completely rational and predicts
the player’s tactical behaviour from a rational perspective under perfect information
through Nash equilibrium. Smith (1974) proposed the Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
(ESS), which is an important concept in evolutionary game theory that liberated the
theory from the perfect rationality hypothesis; ESS facilitated the development of evo-
lutionary game theory. This theory started from a completely new perspective and
reasonably assumed the player’s bounded rational behaviour. Various factors that
affected the player’s behaviour were included in the discussion through multiple
learning adjustment processes to examine the strategy selection issues of the two
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players in the game when the system reached an evolving stable state. Taylor and
Jonker (1978) established a dynamic model of imitators in 1978. Under this frame-
work, the core of game analysis was no longer the optimal strategy selection in trad-
itional games, but an analysis of the process, trends, and stability of strategy
adjustment of members in a group of bounded rational players (Xie, 2002). At the
end of the twentieth century, many economists introduced the theory into economics;
evolutionary game theory then started to shift from the research of symmetrical
games to the gradually in-depth study of asymmetric games (Selten, 1980, 1983;
Friedman, 1991; Taylor, 1979). Since the issuance of small and medium-sized enter-
prises bonds (bills) in China in 2007, they have received extensive attention from the
industry and academia. However, the scale of bond financing is higher, much higher
than that of most small and medium-enterprises. Therefore, it’s hoped to pay atten-
tion to the bank loan model preferred by small enterprises, to pay attention to the
crux of the difficulty of small and medium-sized enterprises in bank loans, and to
solve the problem of the lack of approved collateral in enterprises, to provide feasible
solutions for small and medium-sized enterprises to obtain convenient bank loans,
and to expand financing channels for small and medium-sized enterprises. On this
basis, the different situations in which enterprises participate in collective financing is
designed and studied in the paper, and it makes a classification comparison and rea-
soning on whether enterprises need to provide mortgage loans or not. In the end, it
is concluded that unsecured bank pooled financing loans are also applicable to small
and medium-sized enterprises and banks.
This study establishes a replication dynamic model of evolutionary game and
applies it to the cooperation between small and micro-sized enterprises and commer-
cial banks in the case of a collective financing model. Given the asymmetry of infor-
mation, both banks and enterprises are bounded, rational participants. Thus, this
issue should be discussed using evolutionary game theory. Commercial banks can
gradually understand the strategy selection trend of small and micro-sized enterprises
under different loan modes and analyse their policy adjustment process under differ-
ent policies. After clearly determining the evolutionarily stable strategy of the game
player, banks can design loan products suitable for small and micro-sized enterprises
and improve their financing products and services.
3.1. Collective financing model that require mortgage
3.1.1. Model assumptions
Taking into account the limitation of bank loan of small and medium-sized enter-
prises, five assumptions, such as collective financing loan costs (Madajewicz, 2011),
bank loan review costs (Madajewicz, 2011), loan interest rates (Kodongo & Kendi,
2013), risk reserve fund of the collective financing group (de Quidt et al., 2016), col-
lateral value ratio (de Quidt et al., 2016), are set up by drawing lessons from the issu-
ance mode and mechanism of small and medium-sized enterprises aggregate bonds,
in addition, in this paper, an evolutionary game model for enterprises to obtain bank
loans by means of collective financing is constructed, the change of strategy between
commercial banks and enterprises are made an analysis and reasonable suggestions
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are put forward to improve the financing environment of small and medium-sized
enterprises. Commercial banks mostly use mortgage loans to conduct financing serv-
ices in their actual cooperation with enterprises. The following assumptions are pro-
vided given that small and micro-sized enterprises provided banks with
recognized mortgages.
Assumption 1. Small and micro-sized enterprise can either form a group with multiple
enterprises, negotiate with the bank and obtain loans by collective financing or obtain
loans through individual financing if its own mortgages are sufficient. For the two
methods, the expenses that the enterprise must pay when it chooses to get loans by indi-
vidual financing and collective financing are c1 and c2, respectively, which include con-
tingent guarantee fees, handling fees and loan interest expenses.
Assumption 2. The bank’s review costs of individual financing and collective financing
for each small and micro-sized enterprise in obtaining loans are f1 and f2, respectively.
The loan interest rates are r1 and r2, respectively.
Assumption 3. In the collective financing group, a total of m small and micro-sized
enterprises exist, and each enterprise’s deposit for the collective financing is qi. Then,
the collective financing group indicates a total deposit of Q ¼ Pmi¼1 qi as the risk
reserve fund, which can be repaid to the bank in case of default.
Assumption 4. The values of mortgages that can be provided to the bank when the
enterprise obtains loans by individual financing or collective financing are M1 and
M2
1,1 respectively. The amount of loan that the bank can provide for the enterprise is k
times the amount of the mortgages. However, regular banks indicate a low level of asset
recognition for small and micro-sized enterprises; thus, 0<k<1. The total amount of
funds that for each small and micro-sized enterprise can obtain through individual
financing is kM1, whereas the financing group will use risk reserve for enterprises that
adopt the collective financing method to reimburse the enterprise’s contingent default.
Thus, banks will upgrade the loan amount to n times for small and micro-sized enter-
prises in the collective financing group, which means that the amount of funds that
each enterprise in the group can obtain is nkM2ðn>1Þ.
Assumption 5. If a small and micro-sized enterprise obtains a bank loan and uses it
for normal production and operation, the average profit rate that can be achieved is l.
On the basis of these assumptions, the proceeds that commercial banks can obtain
are nr2kM2f2 when banks adopt the collective financing strategy to finance small
and micro-sized enterprises if the enterprise can repay loans on schedule after
deducting the cost of loan review. The collective financing group will repay the bank
for the defaulting enterprise when a small and micro-sized enterprise cannot repay its
loans on schedule, thereby controlling the spread of bank’s credit risk and ensuring
that the bank’s proceeds are not affected. The deposit qi paid by the enterprise when
it participates in collective financing will be acquired by the collective financing group
or will be used to compensate for the loss made by the defaulting company through
discounted sale, auction and sale of the enterprise to mortgage the bank’s assets.
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Similarly, when small and micro-sized enterprises obtain funds via the individual
financing strategy, the proceeds that the bank can obtain after deducting the cost of the
loan review are r1kM1f1 if they can repay the loans on schedule. When the company
defaults, the proceeds are the earnings of selling the mortgages after deducting the lost
principal and loan review costs,M1kM1f1.
If small and micro-sized enterprises choose to repay their loans on schedule under
the premise of collective financing, the proceeds that the enterprises will receive after
deducting the expenses (including interest) paid for bank loans are nlkM2c2. The
proceeds are lkM1c1 under the individual financing model.
Under the collective financing model, when small and micro-sized enterprises
choose to default, the enterprise needs to deduct the mortgages with a value of M2
and the deposit qi paid to the collective financing group from the original proceeds.
Under the individual financing model, the enterprise does not need to deduct the
deposit qi paid to the collective financing group. When an enterprise defaults, the
interest on the fund is owned by the defaulting enterprise regardless of the financing
model used to obtain the loan. Thus, the corresponding proceeds of defaulting
small and micro-sized enterprises are nlkM2c2 þ nr2kM2M2qi and
lkM1c1 þ r1kM1M1, respectively. Table 1 shows the corresponding payoff matrix
for commercial banks and small and micro-sized enterprises.
3.1.2. Model establishment
The payoff matrix shown in Table 1 is used to jointly build an evolutionary game
model. Any strategy may be used by some of the players in the game for a game with
bounded rationality. Therefore, random pairs of games may appear between commercial
banks and small and micro-sized enterprises. In the commercial bank group, the pro-
portion adopting the ‘collective financing loan’ strategy is xð0<x<1Þ. The proportion of
adopting the ‘individual financing loan’ strategy is 1x. The proportion that adopts the
‘default’ strategy is 1y if the proportion in the small and micro-sized enterprise group
that adopts the ‘repayment on schedule’ strategy is yð0<y<1Þ. Thus, the expected pro-
ceeds of commercial banks in choosing ‘collective financing loan’ and ‘individual financ-
ing loan’ players are uBC and uBS the average group proceeds uB are as follows:
uBC ¼ y  ðnr2kM2f2Þ þ ð1yÞ  ðnr2kM2f2Þ
uBS ¼ y  ðr1kM1f1Þ þ ð1yÞ  ðM1kM1f1Þ
uB ¼ x  uBC þ ð1xÞ  uBS
Table 1. Payoff matrix for commercial banks and small and micro-sized enterprises in collective
financing with mortgages required.
Small and micro-sized enterprises ðyÞ
Repayment on schedule Default
Commercial BankðxÞ Collective financing loan nr2kM2f2, nlkM2c2 nr2kM2f2, nlkM2c2 þ nr2kM2M2qi
Individual financing loan r1kM1f1, lkM1c1 M1kM1f1, lkM1c1 þ r1kM1M1
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The expected proceeds of small and micro-sized enterprise groups as game parties
that choose to ‘repay on schedule’ and ‘default’ are uER and uED, respectively, and the
average group proceeds uE are:
uER ¼ x  ðnlkM2c2Þ þ ð1xÞ  ðlkM1c1Þ
uED ¼ x  ðnlkM2c2 þ nr2kM2M2qiÞ þ ð1xÞ  ðlkM1c1 þ r1kM1M1Þ
uE ¼ y  uER þ ð1yÞ  uED
We then analyse the rate of dynamic changes of different group proportions in the
bounded rational parties involved in the small and micro-sized enterprise collective
financing game under different types of strategies. The rate of dynamic change of the
proportion depends on the speed of learning of the two players, namely, the commer-
cial bank group and the small and micro-sized enterprise group. The rate is related
to the ratio of the mock object and its success degree (can be expressed by the extra
after the average proceeds are deducted from proceeds of this type). Therefore, based
on the replicator dynamics model (Taylor & Jonker, 1978), the following dynamic dif-
ferential equation can be used to represent the rate of change dxdt ¼ x  ðuBCuBÞ of
group proportion x, which adopts the collective financing loan strategy when the
game player is a bank.
This equation is also referred to as the ‘replication dynamic equation’ because it is
consistent with the idea of replication dynamics in the natural selection process of
biological evolution. The expected proceeds uBC of commercial banks when choosing
the ‘collective financing loan’ strategy and the average proceeds uB of the group are
substituted into the above replication dynamic equation. The bank’s replication
dynamic equation can be obtained as:
dx
dt
¼ x  ð1xÞ  ðnr2kM2f2M1 þ kM1 þ f1Þy  ðr1kM1 þ kM1M1Þ
 
(1)
Similarly, the replication dynamic equation of small and micro-sized enterprises
can be obtained as:
dy
dt




After the above model is established, the evolutionarily stable strategy of the game
can be discussed further based on the replication dynamic equation.
Firstly, we use Equation (1) to analyse the bank’s strategy. The replication dynamic
equation of the bank is dxdt ¼ 0. We can obtain three points where a steady state is
reached, which are x ¼ 0, x ¼ 1, and y ¼ ðnr2kM2f2þf1ÞðM1kM1Þr1kM1ðM1kM1Þ , respectively;
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r1kM1  M1kM1 will not be discussed because it does not conform to reality. Only
the following three possibilities on the premise of r1kM1<M1kM1 are analysed.
Scenario 1: r1kM1<M1kM1<nr2kM2f2 þ f1. At this time, y 2 ð1, 0Þ and
y>y. Based on the theorem of stability of differential equations, x ¼ 1 is an evolu-
tionarily stable strategy for commercial banks. According to the payoff matrix shown
in Table 1, the proceeds (r1kM1f1 or M1kM1f1) obtained by the banks via indi-
vidual financing loans are lower than those by collective financing loans (nr2kM2f2)
whether small and micro-sized enterprises choose to default or not. Thus, after a
period of evolution, banks will choose to provide a collective financing loan strategy
that does not depend on the choice of enterprise strategy.
Scenario 2: r1kM1<nr2kM2f2 þ f1<M1kM1. At this time, y 2 ð0, 1Þ. The payoff
matrix shown in Table 1 indicates that the proceeds (nr2kM2f2) of the commercial
bank that chooses the collective financing loan strategy are higher than those
(r1kM1f1) when the bank chooses individual financing loan strategy on the premise
that small and micro-sized enterprises repay on schedule. By contrast, lower proceeds
(M1kM1f1) are obtained in the event that an enterprise defaults. If y ¼ y, all x
are in a stable state; if y>y, then x ¼ 1 is an evolutionarily stable strategy for com-
mercial banks; if y<y, then x ¼ 0 is an evolutionarily stable strategy for commercial
banks. That is, when the proportion of enterprises that chooses to repay on schedule
is y in the initial state, the bank’s strategy will no longer change. In other words, the
proceeds will be the same whether the bank chooses to adopt the collective financing
strategy. By contrast, when the proportion of enterprises that chooses to repay on
schedule is higher than y, the bank will choose to adopt a collective financing loan
strategy to serve the enterprise after long-term evolution. When the proportion of
enterprises that chooses to repay on schedule is lower than y, the bank will choose
to adopt an individual financing loan strategy to serve the enterprise after long-
term evolution.
Scenario 3: nr2kM2f2 þ f1<r1kM1<M1kM1. At this time, y 2 ð1, þ1Þ and
y<y. Based on the stability theorem of differential equations, x ¼ 0 is the evolution-
arily stable strategy for commercial banks. The banks’ proceeds (r1kM1f1 or
M1kM1f1) via individual financing are higher than those via collective financing
(nr2kM2f2) regardless of whether small and micro-sized enterprises choose to
default. After a period of evolution, banks will all choose the individual financing
loan strategy to provide financial support for small and micro-sized enterprises. This
strategy does not depend on the enterprise’s strategic choices and changes.
The analysis of the three possible strategies of banks shows that the business strat-
egy of commercial banks is centered on maximising profits. However, when consider-
ing the safety of funds and risk control issues, the bank will classify strategies based
on small and micro-sized enterprise’s willingness to repay. When the enterprise’s will-
ingness to repay is high, the bank will offer a collective financing loan strategy. When
willingness to repay is low, the bank will choose the traditional individual financing
loan strategy to prevent the spread of risks.
We then analyse the strategic choices of small and micro-sized enterprises. Let
equation (2), i.e., the replication dynamic equation of small and micro-sized enter-
prises dydt ¼ 0. We can then obtain y ¼ 0, y ¼ 1, and x ¼ r1kM1M1ðr1kM1M1Þðnr2kM2M2qiÞ.
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According to the range of values of r1 and k, we can see that r1kM1M1<0.
Therefore, the issue is discussed in three scenarios.
Scenario 4: nr2kM2M2qi<r1kM1M1<0. At this time, x 2 ð1, 0Þ and x>x.
Based on the stability theorem of differential equations, y ¼ 1 is the evolutionarily
stable strategy for small and micro-sized enterprises.
Scenario 5: r1kM1M1<nr2kM2M2qi<0. At this time, x 2 ð1, þ1Þ and
x<x. y ¼ 1 is the evolutionarily stable strategy for small and micro-sized enterprises.
Scenario 6: r1kM1M1<0<nr2kM2M2qi. At this time, x 2 ð0, 1Þ. If x ¼ x,
then all y are in a stable state. By contrast, when x>x, y ¼ 0 is the evolutionarily
stable strategy for small and micro-sized enterprises. When x<x, y ¼ 1 is the evolu-
tionarily stable strategy for small and micro-sized enterprises.
In both Scenarios 4 and 5, nr2kM2M2qi<0 is satisfied; that is, when
nr2kM2<M2 þ qi, y ¼ 1 is the evolutionarily stable strategy of small and micro-sized
enterprises. When a bank adopts a collective financing strategy to provide loans for
enterprises, enterprises will all choose to repay the bank on schedule instead of
default if the loan interest (nr2kM2) that the enterprise is liable for is less than the
value of the enterprise’s mortgages and the total deposit (M2 þ qi) paid to the collect-
ive financing group, after a period of strategic evolution. This strategy is not affected
by the strategy choice of commercial banks.
Scenario 6: solely establishes nr2kM2M2qi>0, i.e., nr2kM2>M2 þ qi. This find-
ing indicates that when the loan interest that the small and micro-sized enterprise is
liable for is greater than the value of the enterprise’s mortgages and the total deposit
paid to the collective financing group. If the proportion of collective financing pro-
vided by the bank to the small and micro-sized enterprise at the initial stage is x,
whether the enterprise chooses to repay on schedule or to default, the bank’s pro-
ceeds will always be the same. If the proportion of collective financing provided by
the bank to the small and micro-sized enterprise at the initial stage is higher than x,
after a period of strategy evolution, the enterprise’s stable strategy is y ¼ 0. This situ-
ation indicates that small and micro enterprises will still choose to default because of
high interest rate. If the proportion collective financing provided by the bank to the
enterprise at the initial stage is lower than x. After a period of strategy evolution,
y ¼ 1 is the stable strategy of small and micro-sized enterprises, which indicates that
enterprises that can only choose the individual financing model will still choose to
repay on schedule under higher interest rates after considering the credit history of
late-stage loans. However, this high enterprise operating cost will affect the sustain-
able development of the enterprise.
Therefore, even if the bank offers a convenient collective financing method for
small and micro-sized enterprises, the enterprises will still collectively take risks and
choose to default to maintain their operations in the case that enterprises are liable
for higher interest costs. This situation indicates that when the loan interest setting in
commercial banks are unreasonable. The innovative financing model is not only
unable to solve the fund supply problem for small and micro-sized enterprises, but
also engenders potential credit risks. Thus, we set a reference interest rate r2 ¼ M2þqinkM2
for banks to use for collective financing by combining the discussion of the above
three scenarios. When the commercial bank’s actual collective financing lending rate
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is smaller than r2 (i.e., Scenarios 4 and 5), small and micro-sized enterprises indicate
a smaller risk of default and will repay bank loans on schedule. When the commercial
bank’s actual collective financing lending rate is greater than r2 (i.e., Scenario 6),
small and micro-sized enterprises will choose different strategies according to the
financing plan offered by the bank in the initial stage. However, even if the enter-
prises do not default, they will not be able to generate stable profits to maintain nor-
mal corporate operations because of high interest rates.
3.2. Collective financing model not requiring mortgages
3.2.1. Model assumptions
For most small and micro-sized enterprises, presenting mortgages that are generally
recognized by commercial banks is not easy. Therefore, we aim to integrate previous
studies on the comparison of mortgages’ role in the provision of collective financing
loans for small and micro-sized enterprises by banks. The present study assumes that
small and micro-sized enterprises that adopted collective financing to get loans no
longer present mortgages to commercial banks but only pay deposits to the collective
financing group. Deposits from multiple small and micro-sized enterprises constitute
the risk reserve of the collective financing group. When a certain enterprise in the
group defaults on credit and cannot repay the loan to the bank on schedule, the
enterprise’s collective financing group will use the risk reserve fund to repay the loan
first and assume the responsibility of corporate finance guarantor. Thus, even if the
enterprises cannot provide corresponding mortgages, commercial banks can still pro-
vide loans for each enterprise in the group. The amount is n ðn>1Þ times the total
amount of deposit paid to the collective financing group, i.e., nqi. This finding is
based on the ‘intragroup guarantee’ model, which is constructed by small and micro-
sized enterprises.
Based on the above assumptions, when a bank adopts a collective financing strat-
egy that does not include mortgages, regardless of whether the enterprise defaults, the
bank will receive interest income after deducting the loan review cost; that is,
nr2qif2. When small and micro-sized enterprises repay loans on schedule, the pro-
ceeds obtained by the enterprise will only need to deduct the costs required to apply
for the loan (including interest). In the event of default, the enterprise will also lose
the deposit paid to the collective financing group. However, for individual financing
loan strategy, the proceeds of commercial banks and small and micro-sized enter-
prises are the same as the loan proceeds in the case of mortgages. The corresponding
proceeds of commercial banks and small and micro-sized enterprises when mortgages
are not required are shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Payoff matrix for commercial banks and small and micro-sized enterprises in collective
financing with mortgages not required.
Small and micro-sized enterprises ðyÞ
Repayment on schedule Default
Commercial BankðxÞ Collective financing loan nr2qif2, nlqic2 nr2qif2, nlqic2 þ nr2qiqi
Individual financing loan r1kM1f1, lkM1c1 M1kM1f1, lkM1c1 þ r1kM1M1
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3.2.2. Model establishment
We obtain the expected proceeds u0BC, u0BS and average group proceeds u0B when
commercial banks choose ‘collective financing loan’ and ‘individual financing loan’,
respectively. We use the payoff matrix shown in Table 2, similar to the loan model of
collective financing with mortgages.
u0BC ¼ y  ðnr2qif2Þ þ ð1yÞ  ðnr2qif2Þ
u0BS ¼ y  ðr1kM1f1Þ þ ð1yÞ  ðM1kM1f1Þ
u0B ¼ x  u0BC þ ð1xÞ  u0BS
The expected proceeds and average group proceeds under the two strategies of
‘repayment on schedule’ and ‘default’ in the small and micro-sized enterprise groups
are:
u0ER ¼ x  ðnlqic2Þ þ ð1xÞ  ðlkM1c1Þ
u0ED ¼ x  ðnlqic2 þ nr2qiqiÞ þ ð1xÞ  ðlkM1c1 þ r1kM1M1Þ
u0E ¼ y  u0ER þ ð1yÞ  u0ED
In the collective financing loan model with mortgages, the replication dynamic
equations of banks and small and micro-sized enterprises are:
dx
dt









On the basis of the replication dynamic equations of bank’s secured loans and
unsecured loans; that is, Equations (1) and (3), we can conclude that bank’s strategy
choice under unsecured loans is similar to that under secured loans. The following
discussion focuses on the strategic choices of small and micro-sized enterprises.
We let Equation (4) be the replication dynamic equation of small and micro-sized
enterprises in the case of unsecured asset loans dydt ¼ 0, and y ¼ 0, y ¼ 1, and
x ¼ r1kM1M1ðr1kM1M1Þðnr2qiqiÞ. Based on the range of values of r1 and k discussed above,
r1kM1M1<0 is always established. The issue will be discussed in the below
three scenarios.
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Scenario 7: nr2qiqi<r1kM1M1<0. At this time, x 2 ð1, 0Þ and x>x. Based
on the stability theorem of differential equations, y ¼ 1 is the evolutionarily stable
strategy for small and micro-sized enterprises.
Scenario 8: r1kM1M1<nr2qiqi<0. At this time, x 2 ð1, þ1Þ, so x<x and
y ¼ 1 is still the evolutionarily stable strategy for small and micro-sized enterprises.
Scenario 9: r1kM1M1<0<nr2qiqi. At this time, x 2 ð0, 1Þ. When x<x, y ¼ 1
is the evolutionarily stable strategy for small and micro-sized enterprises. When
x>x, y ¼ 0 is the evolutionarily stable strategy for small and micro-sized enterprises.
Based on Scenarios 7 and 8, as long as nr2qiqi<0, that is, the interest paid by
small and micro-sized enterprises under collective financing is less than the deposit
paid to the collective financing group, after a period of evolution, enterprises will all
choose to repay the bank on schedule. By contrast, when nr2qiqi>0; that is, the
interest paid by small and micro-sized enterprises to the bank is more than the
deposit that they need to pay, the enterprise’s strategy choice is related to the propor-
tion of banks that choose to adopt the collective financing model at the initial stage.
When the proportion is less than the critical value x after a period of evolution,
small and micro-sized enterprises will choose to repay on schedule. By contrast, the
enterprises will choose to default when the proportion is greater than the critical
value x after a period of evolution.
Based on the strategic analysis of banks and enterprises in the collective financing
model without mortgages, we conclude that the strategy choices of the two are the
same as those in the case of secured loans. Therefore, in the enterprise’s collective
financing model assumed in this paper, whether small and micro-sized enterprises
can provide mortgages recognized by commercial banks does not affect the repay-
ment of enterprises. However, if we blindly require small and micro-sized enterprises
with insufficient funds to get loans only by mortgages, this requirement will block the
financing channels of enterprises. This situation is not conducive to the development
of multiple innovative financing models and also introduces difficulties for small and
micro-sized enterprises to obtain suitable financial services.
It is worth noting that free riding is common in collective action. However, in
order to prevent this from happening, banks still need to conduct detailed credit
reviews and assessments of each enterprise involved in pooled financing to ensure
that there is no malicious free riding in the aggregate. The adoption of a collective
financing model only facilitates small and medium-enterprises with insufficient assets
so that they no longer have to provide hard-to-obtain collateral to obtain loans that
cannot be obtained with the advantage of the social capital that exists in the cluster.
However, the pre-loan review process will not be relaxed in any way, while will make
it more difficult, as it will no longer serve as a basis for the results of credit audits
based on the quality of collateral, but attention should be paid to the correlation
between the development potential of the enterprise and the aggregate of enterprises
(because the higher the correlation is, the more likely the collective default is (Huo,
Feng, & Li, 2013). However, as a matter of fact, the design of collective financing
mechanism also prevents the occurrence of free riding behaviour of enterprises to a
certain extent. As the construction of an enterprise collection requires that when a
default occurs, the members of the collection jointly and severally compensate for
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breach of contract damages and loan losses (that is, the risk reserve paid at the initial
stage of the build-up of the collection referred to in assumption 4), which constrains
the members of the group to select the aggregate members carefully and supervise
and restrain each other to prevent loan default and reduce the probability of free rid-
ing behaviour.
3.3. Further discussion
In the current environment of China, the collective financing model without mort-
gage is more suitable for financing loans of small and medium-enterprises. We can
draw conclusions from the following four aspects:
The first is availability of financing. Usually, China’s small and medium-enterprises
have weak capital strength, and tangible fixed assets are relatively lacking. When there
is a demand for financing, it is generally preferable to choose non-governmental loans
with high interest rates, reflecting that bank loans, which are formal channels of
financing, can provide very limited assistance to small and medium-enterprises.
Extensively high the mortgage guarantee requirement makes many small and micro
enterprises back off, gave up the convenient bank loan, but only look for the financ-
ing way with higher cost. However, the way of collective financing solves the inherent
problem of small and medium-enterprises lacking mortgage assets, has the mechan-
ism of mutual restraint and supervision within the group, avoids the malpractice of
obtaining asymmetric information of enterprises, reduces the threshold of enterprise
loan, and promotes the availability of financing.
The second is financing costs. When businesses own collateral and carry out bank
mortgages, they may have stronger negotiating terms to lower loan prices and get the
money they need and unsecured enterprises need to comply with the bank’s loan
requirements. Under the collective financing model established in this paper, in add-
ition to the bank interest, it’s necessary for each enterprise to pay the default reserve
to prevent the intra-group enterprises from defaulting, therefore, the cost of financing
seems to be higher. Therefore, setting a reasonable ratio of damages for default can
not only ensure that the financing cost of small and medium-enterprises is not raised
too high, at the same time, it also plays a role in restricting the repayment of loans
by enterprises, which is also the direction that the author needs further research and
exploration in the next stage.
The third is financing default risk. It’s true that, in the event of a corporate default,
mortgages can be compensated by auctioning off bank-approved collateral, with high
recovery rate. However, as long as bank-approved collateral is provided, loans can be
obtained in such a way that banks will lower their pre-loan audit standards. On the
contrary, the hidden danger of financing default is left behind, which is not condu-
cive to the development of the loan business of small and medium-enterprises. In the
collective financing mode without collateral, banks need to carry out full due dili-
gence before lending, design a more scientific basis for credit review, and check the
occurrence of default risk of enterprises, which is more reasonable than relying on
only one kind of collateral as a means of loan review, and the way is conducive to
the prevention of the risk of financing default.
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The last is audit cost of bank credit. Under the mortgage model, most banks use
the provision of approved collateral as the key criterion for credit review. Therefore,
the cost of enterprise investigation is small, and the collective financing mode of
unsecured loan certainly requires the bank to carry out a detailed investigation in
many aspects, such as the operation of individual enterprises, the historical credit
situation of enterprises and the degree of correlation among enterprises, etc.
Therefore, in the initial stage of this new loan mode, the audit cost of the bank will
be a little higher. However, generally speaking, in order to extend loans to multiple
enterprises, when it is necessary for banks to develop a more comprehensive credit
audit system to ensure higher audit efficiency, reduce the average cost of loan audit,
it’s also to create convenient conditions for small and medium-enterprises to
obtain funds.
4. Conclusion
When banks or other financial institutions choose a collective financing model to
finance small and medium-enterprises, it’s conductive for them to reduce the cost of
loan review and improve the efficiency of loan approval. At the same time, commer-
cial banks can also provide other financial services for small and medium-sized enter-
prises, expand the scope of intermediate business of banks, and enhance their own
competitiveness. For small and medium-sized enterprises with the same development
stage, not only can the collective financing model help banks to reduce the average
approval cost and average supervision cost in the later stage of loan, but also helps to
improve the financing efficiency of enterprises and standardize the financial system of
small and medium-sized enterprises.
From the point of view of current development, the mode of collective financing
also has some limitations. On the one hand, in the initial stage of establishment, the
collective financing model will absorb the short-funded small and medium-enterprises
at a lower threshold to join the portfolio, therefore, the amount of margin paid by
each enterprise to the pooled portfolio is generally low. On the other hand, for many
small and medium-enterprises with cash flow constraints, they will take a wait-and-
see approach to measure this innovative financing model and reduce the number of
enterprises that actually participate in the fund-raising model. As a result, the risk
reserve of the financing portfolio is limited, and commercial banks will reduce the
magnification of the loan limit. Therefore, it will be the further research direction of
this problem on how to improve the existing collective financing operation mode,
integrate high-quality enterprise resources, improve the operational efficiency, and
provide more convenient financing channels for more small and medium-enterprises.
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Note
1. When assessing mortgages before granting loans, banks will consider the price
fluctuations of the enterprise’s mortgages via auctions or discount sales in the event of a
future default. Therefore, we may assume that the price of assets recognized by the
enterprise is the value of assess in future discount sales.
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